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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 960507-CA
Priority No. 2

BETTY BASTA,
Defendant/Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate
jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (I) (1953
as amended).

This case and the companion appellate

jurisdiction were transferred to this Court by the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953
as amended), Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1953 as
amended) and as provided by letter dated July 31, 1996, from
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court. (R.
267) .
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the State of Utah violate Mrs. Basta's rights

to due process of law and her rights to a fair trial as
guaranteed in Art. I, § 7, of the Utah Constitution and the
5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States
Constitution (A) by failing to disclose exculpatory
information, (B) by introducing false/perjured testimony and
(C) by inappropriate prosecutorial argument and misconduct?
Standard of Review.
A trial court's determination of whether the State
violated constitutional rights is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness, and will not be reversed unless
"clearly erroneous" State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19 (Utah App.
1993).

However, the trial court's conclusions of law are

accorded no deference by the reviewing court.

State v.

Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v.

Wilcox, 808

P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,
781-82 (Utah 1991).
2.

Did the State of Utah violate Mrs. Basta's

rights to due process of law and her rights to a fair trial
as guaranteed in Art. I, § 7, of the Utah Constitution and
the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States
Constitution by failing to preserve the crime scene,
destroying material evidence and unfairly attacking her
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expert witness?
Standard of Review.
A trial court's determination of whether a
constitutional right to due process and a fair trial is
violated is a question of law that is reviewed for
correctness, and will not be reversed unless "'clearly
erroneous" State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, (Utah App. 1993).
However, the trial court's conclusions of law are accorded
no deference by the reviewing court.
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v.

State v. Deli, 8 61
Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,

1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82
(Utah 1991) .
3.

Whether the cumulative errors in this trial require

a reversal of Mrs. Basta's convictions.
Standard of Review.
The doctrine of harmless error applies to "errors which,
although properly preserved below and presented on appeal,
are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is
no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings."

State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949,

957-58 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 120 (Utah 1989)), aff'd 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995).

For

an error to require reversal, "the likelihood of a different
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in
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the verdict."

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah

1987) .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah
Constitutions are presented for interpretation, and they
provide:
Amendment V of the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part:
nor shall [he] be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law;
Amendment VI of the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed,
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part:
Section 1. . . . [no State shall] deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . .
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
[Due Process of Law] No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.
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Article I, § 12, of the Utah Constitution provides (in
pertinent part):
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, . . . to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights
herein guaranteed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case,

This case comes to the Utah

Court of Appeals (poured-over from the supreme court) from
convictions of Mrs. Basta for Aggravated Arson, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103
(1953 as amended)(See Addendum "A");

and Insurance Fraud, a

second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6521 (1994) (See Addendum " A " ) , in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.
The case involved a house fire of the family home of
Mrs. Basta, her husband and son.

The State presented a case

focusing on financial pressures as motives for an
intentional fire to gain insurance funds argued to have been
set by Mrs. Basta.

The defense contended the fire was an

accidental fire and if no arson was committed then likewise
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no insurance fraud.

B.

Course of the Proceedings.

Mrs. Basta was charged

by way of Information with the offenses of Aggravated Arson
and Insurance Fraud on April 6, 1995.

The charges stem

from the destruction of the family home in Sandy, Utah by
house fire on February 11, 1995.

Following her initial

appearance before the magistrate, Mrs. Basta was appointed a
Public Defender.

On April 11, 1995, Mark R. Moffat entered

his appearance and filed a request for discovery.

As of

that date, however, the crime scene had been cleaned up and
the home actually repaired and remodeled by an interim owner
who had rented back the home to Mrs. Basta's family.
The case went to trial over four days, November 14-17,
1995, resulting in convictions as charged on both counts.
Subsequent to the verdicts, counsel for Mrs. Basta filed
motions to arrest judgment and/or a new trial.

The trial

court denied those motions after written memoranda and
arguments in December of 1995.
Sentencing proceeded and the court placed Mrs. Basta on
probation after service of jail time and conditioned on
payment of restitution of $90,416.81, recoup fee of $500.00,
and other conditions ordered by the court. (R. 242). She
continues on probation at the filing of this opening brief.
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After timely filing the Notice of Appeal, Docketing
statements and several continuances to file this brief, the
Legal Defenders Office conflicted out of the case concerning
potential claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Current counsel was then appointed and prior to the filing
of the opening brief, filed a 23B motion to remand for a
hearing regarding the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
This Court partially granted that motion on the 24th day
of April, 1996, specifically articulating the issues subject
to the remand.
The trial court scheduled and held the 23B hearing and
denied Mrs. Basta's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

The denial of those specifically articulated

issues subject to the remand are NOT subject of this appeal.
Rather, this appeal is based on the trial and errors
resulting therefrom and from the trial court's denial of
Mrs. Basta's claims supporting her motion to arrest judgment
or for new trial.

C.

Statement of the Facts.

Betty Basta resided at the

address of 916 East Peachblossom Drive in Sandy, Utah, with
her husband Robert and son Brent. (R. 757). The Bastas had
lived in the home for over twenty years.
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On February 11,

1995, the Bastas' home was destroyed by a fire.(R. 769).
In the years preceding the fire, the Bastas had endured
substantial financial hardship. (R. 325, 327). Robert Basta
had lost a major janitorial account which provided
supplemental income for the family.

Because of the

reduction in income, the Bastas were unable to make their
house payments. (R. 667). In 1994, the Bastas were faced
with the prospect of losing their house. (R. 668). The
Bastas then entered into a contractual agreement with
Lakeside Properties and Lyndon Parks whereby Parks would
purchase the Basta home and thereafter allow the Bastas to
lease the home with an option to purchase. (R. 310) The
Bastas were required to make monthly rental payments and
continue remodeling the basement of the home. (R. 624). The
Bastas were also required to maintain insurance on the home.
(R. 632) .
Betty Basta controlled the family finances. (R. 667-68)
A dispute developed between Mrs. Basta and Lakeside
Properties as to the amount of the monthly "lease" payment.
Mrs. Basta refused to pay the amount requested by Lakeside.
(R. 624) .

Lakeside attempted to evict the Bastas in October

1994. (R. 624). The Bastas and Lakeside then reached an
agreement whereby the Bastas were permitted to remain in
their home. (R. 605). The dispute as to the amount remained
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unresolved.
Evidence produced at trial indicated that Mrs. Basta had
applied for full coverage insurance on February 6, 1995. (R.
325-27). This application occurred ten days after the Bastas
allegedly were served with a three-day eviction notice. (R.
327-28).
Testimony from Robert and Brent Basta established that
on February 10, 1995, the day prior to the fire that
destroyed the home, there was a fire in a storage closet in
the basement of the Basta home when Mrs. Basta was not at
home. (R. 760, 769). This fire was extinguished without the
assistance of the fire department. (R. 765). The storage
closet was located under the stairwell. (R. 760, 764, 675,
798).

Prosecution witnesses placed the area of origin on

the floor of the basement family room directly in front of a
common wall shared with the stairwell closet. (R. 339, 346).
The fire grew hot enough to melt the insulation on
electrical wires running through the common wall. (R. 76364) .
Sandy Fire Marshal Dave Meldrum was called to the scene
to investigate the cause and the origin of the February 11,
1995 fire. (R. 407-08) . According to Robert Basta, Meldrum
indicated in that conversation that the fire had started in
the stairwell closet and spread to the basement family room.
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(R. 777). At trial, Meldrum denied that he made that
statement.

(R. 556). Meldrum, however, indicated in a

Uniform Fire Investigation Report (UFIR) that.

the fire was

a "rekindle" of the February 10, 1995 fire and identified
the area or origin as the stairwell closet. (R. 342,347-49,
588). Also, that he was aware that the electrical wiring was
one of the possible causes of the fire (R. 415). The onepage UFIR report was the only written report prepared by the
Fire Marshal. (R. 342, 591). According to trial testimony,
Meldrum removed the electrical wiring from the common wall
separating the closet and family room. (R. 440, 581, 595).
Meldrum claimed he examined the wiring and left it on a
trash can in the basement. (R. 444). Brent Basta testified
on February 11, 1995, he saw two firemen remove the
electrical wiring from the house and place it on a fire
truck.

According to Brent Basta, one of the firemen was

Dave Meldrum. (R. 809). Meldrum denied removing the wire
from the house.

(R. 956) .

At trial Meldrum testified that the fire was
intentionally set. (R. 416, 418, 422, 424). Meldrum claimed
to have eliminated all accidental sources for the fire. (R.
414).

Meldrum testified at trial, however, that there was

in fact damage to the wiring found in the common wall. (R.
441, 444-48).

Photographs taken of the wiring revealed
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signs of arcing and beading, indicating that the wire had
shorted at some point. (R. 444-48).

Meldrum testified that

the wire was damaged by the fire and was not the cause of
the fire.

(R. 440-41) .

Meldrum claimed to have reached this conclusion through
gross physical examination of the wire alone.

Meldrum

claimed that the lack of brittleness and discoloration as
well as the overall pliability of the wire indicated that
the wire did not cause the fire. (R. 416, 441-48) .
Meldrum claimed that the wiring was "unimportant" and
was not evidence. (R. 441-44).

However, 15 of the 36

photographs taken of the fire scene by Meldrum were pictures
of wiring. (R. 440-450).

The conditions relied on by

Meldrum, i.e., brittleness, discoloration and pliability,
were not discernable from the photographs. (R. 441, 959).
Meldrum did not prepare a single written report with respect
to the condition of the wire.

Meldrum likewise did not

take a single photograph of the breaker panel. (R. 427-450).
Although Meldrum indicated that he left the wire at the
fire scene, the wire was clearly not present when insurance
company fire investigators examined the scene. (R. 671-73).
Donald Peak of Phoenix Investigators examined the scene
immediately following the fire. (R. 647). Jerry Thompson, a
personal friend of Meldrum, examined the fire scene in the
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days following the fire.

Both men had conversations with

Meldrum. (R. 647-48, 865). Neither man was told of the fact
that the wiring had been removed and placed on the garbage
can despite Meldrum's testimony that he told Peak where the
wiring was. (R. 649, 696, 863-64).
Peak indicated in notes prepared contemporaneously with
his fire scene examination that the fire started "on or near
the west wall just inside the doorway." (R. 699-702).

This

area of origin is the exact location of the wiring removed
by Meldrum.

Peak also noted in his investigation log dated

February 19, 1995, that there needed to be an inspection of
the electrical boxes and wiring removed by Meldrum. (R.
735).

That the electrical wiring was one of the possible

causes of the fire (R. 686).
Further, David Smith, Certified Fire Investigator (CFI),
testified of the likely role the wiring played in the
ignition of the fire.

Smith testified that the cause of the

fire was accidental and was started by either unextinguished
embers of the fire of February 10, 1995, or shorts in the
wiring.

(R. 911). Smith testified that gross physical

examination of the wire was insufficient to eliminate the
wiring as a source of the fire.

(R. 916). Smith also

testified that the photographs taken for the scene by
Meldrum and others clearly indicated the role of the wiring
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in the causation of the fire. (R. 912-17) . Charring depicted
in the photograph of the 2" x 4" stud wall was heaviest in
the exact location of the electrical wiring and service
boxes.
Following the fire and fire scene investigation, the
home at 916 East Peachblossom Drive was gutted and
remodeled. (R. 220-37, 1063).

Demolition crew demolished

the basement of the house on April 4, 5, 6, 7, and 19 of
1995.

This work materially altered the fire scene.

Mrs.

Basta was charged on April 6, 1995. (R. 6, 464). By the
time she was appointed counsel on April 11, 1995, the
demolition work on the home was complete. (R. 220-27, 1063).
Moreover, not only had the home been demolished, the
majority of the basement had been reframed, rewired and
remodeled. (R. 218-227) .
At trial, the State cross-examined Mrs. Basta's expert,
David Smith, CFI, regarding his on-the-scene fire
examination. (R. 920). Smith testified that he had not
examined the scene of the fire, a factual impossibility. (R.
922).

The State argued that his testimony was not credible

because he had not conducted an on-the-scene fire
investigation. (R. 1035) .
Defense counsel entered his appearance and filed a
Request for discovery pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of
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Criminal Procedure, wherein defendant specifically requested
exculpatory information, witness lists and any plea bargain
agreements provided to any witnesses as provided in
discovery rules.
On April 28, 1995, Dave Meldrum was arrested on
allegation of theft of a trailer. (R. 467, 192). When
questioned by police about the offense Meldrum lied and
produced a forged receipt of sale for the trailer.

Meldrum

was thereafter charged with Theft of a Trailer, a third
degree felony, by the Salt Lake District Attorney's office.
(R. 192). Meldrum was not charged with tampering with
evidence, a second degree felony, nor with providing false
information to a police officer.

The Prosecutor at no time

notified defense counsel of Meldrum's arrest or of the fact
that charges had been filed. (R. 185).
On July 20, 1995, Meldrum appeared with counsel Robert
Pusey before Honorable Roger A. Livingston on charges of
Theft of a Trailer. (R. 192). At that time, Meldrum,
pursuant to a plea bargain agreement with the State of Utah,
entered a plea of "No Contest" to an amended charge of
Attempted Theft of a Trailer, a class A misdemeanor.
Meldrum's plea of "No Contest" was then held in abeyance by
the court for a period of one year.

Pursuant to the terms

of the agreement between the parties the court would dismiss
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Meldrum's case after one year of "good behavior" which
included no further violations of the law and payment of
$150.00 in court costs. (See Addendum "B") The Prosecutor at
no time informed the defense of Meldrum's charges, the plea
bargain or of the fact that the plea was held in abeyance in
exchange for his cooperation.
At the time of trial Meldrum was cross-examined as to
the relationship between the plea bargain and his testimony
as an expert witness for the State. (R. 466-78).

Meldrum

testified that there was absolutely no relationship between
the two; that his testimony against Mrs. Basta had nothing
to do with the plea bargain offered him by the prosecution.
(R. Id.). Meldrum testified that he was "offended" at the
mere suggestion of a deal in exchange for his testimony.
(R.473) .
In closing argument counsel for Mrs. Basta attacked
Meldrum's credibility and argued that because of his plea
bargain, Meldrum was biased. (R. 1001-03)

The prosecution

rebutted arguing that there was no deal with Meldrum.
Further, the prosecution stated that the fact that Meldrum
came to court and testified in the absence of a deal and
despite of his dismissal as Sandy Fire Marshal spoke to the
"the character of the man." (R. 1034).
Following trial, defense counsel subpoenaed the tape of
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Dave Meldrum's criminal plea before Judge Livingston. (R.
1075-76).

The transcript of that plea clearly indicates

that Meldrum was given his plea bargain because he was a
witness for the State in ongoing Arson prosecutions:
Judge: Mr. Shepherd is this your case?
Mr. D'Alesandro: it's mine your honor.
Judge Q: Why are we entering a no contest on a
theft case?
Mr. D'Alesandro: Well, there's actually a couple
of reasons. Chief among them is that Mr.. Meldrum,
regardless of his prior position, is still involved in
several felony investigations, cases that are pending
and our plan at this point is to continue to prosecute
those cases and with Mr.. Meldrum's cooperation.
Judge: Are you telling me that a felony.. That
misdemeanor plea would disable Mr. Meldrum from being
a witness?
A: No, but I think ah.. It wouldn't disable him
but with a no contest plea it would less likely be
used for impeachment purposes. I guess the thought is
your honor, is that he's an expert witness and would
be subject to impeachment and no contest will have to
be collaterally established in similar fashion to what
happens here today.
(See Addendum " C " ) .
At argument on Mrs. Basta's Motion to Arrest Judgment
and/or Motion for a New Trial, the prosecutor, Mr. Ernest
Jones, stated that he was aware that Meldrum had been
charged and that he had been offered a deal. (R. 1080).
Jones indicated that at no time was defense counsel advised

16

of that information. (R. 1082-83).

The trial court

nonetheless denied Mrs. Basta's motions.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On Appeal, Mrs. Basta, first contends that the
Prosecutions failure to disclose exculpatory information,
introducing false/perjured testimony and inappropriate
argument during closing violated Mrs. Basta's constitutional
rights and requires a new trial.
Secondly, Mrs. Basta alleges that she was unfairly
prejudice in her defense.

The prejudiced stems from

defense's inability to conduct an on-the-scene investigation
of the fire and then suffering an unfair attack of her
expert based on his inability to conduct an on-the-scene
investigation.
Lastly, the cumulative errors occurring at trial
prevented Mrs. Basta from receiving a fair trial.
POINT I.
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY INFORMATION,
INTRODUCING FALSE/PERJURED TESTIMONY AND
INAPPROPRIATE ARGUMENT VIOLATED MRS. BASTA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL.
Mrs. Basta contends that her rights to a fair trial as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I Section 12 of the Utah
17

Constitution and her rights to Due Process of Law as
guaranteed by Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to United States
Constitution were violated when the State failed to disclose
to her exculpatory information prior to trial.

Mrs. Basta's

rights were further violated when the State introduced and
relied on perjured testimony at trial in Mrs. Basta's case.
Mrs. Basta was charged by way of Information with the
offense of Aggravated Arson on April 6, 1995.

The Criminal

Information listed Sandy City Fire Marshal, Dave Meldrum,
among others, as a witness in the case.

Following her

initial appearance before the magistrate, Mrs. Basta was
appointed a Public Defender.

On April 11, 1995, Mark R.

Moffat entered his appearance and filed a request for
discovery pursuant to Rule 16 Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure wherein defendant specifically requested the
following:
1.
Any evidence which tends to negate the guilt
of the defendant, or mitigate the guilt of the
defendant or mitigate the degree of offense, which
has been discovered by any member of the agencies
involved in the investigation or prosecution of
the above-entitled victim.
7.
A list of all the witnesses that the State
intends to call for trial in the above-entitled
matter.
18

10. Any offers of leniency or plea bargain
agreements or other forms of remuneration provided
to any of the witnesses listed in number (2) and
(3)above.
(R. 14-16) .
On April 28, 1995, Dave Meldrum was arrested on
allegation of Theft of a Trailer.

When questioned by police

about the offense Meldrum lied and produced a forged receipt
of sale for the trailer.

Meldrum was thereafter charged

with Theft of a Trailer, a third degree felony, by the Salt
Lake District Attorney's office.

Meldrum was not charged

with Tampering with Evidence, a second degree felony, nor
was he charged with Providing False Information to a Police
Officer.

The State at no time notified defense counsel of

Meldrum's arrest or of the fact that charges had been filed
against him.
On July 20, 1995, Meldrum appeared with counsel before
the Honorable Roger A. Livingston on charges of Theft of a
Trailer.

At that time, Meldrum entered a plea of "No

Contest" to the amended charges of Attempted Theft of a
Trailer, a class A misdemeanor.

Meldrum's plea of "No

Contest" was held in abeyance by the court for a period of
one year.

Pursuant to the terms of the agreement between

the parties the court would dismiss Meldrum's case on one
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year of "Good Behavior", which included no further
violations of the law and payment of $150.00 in court costs.
(See Addendum " B " ) .

The Prosecutor at no time informed the

defense of Meldrum' s plea or of the fact that the plea was
held in abeyance.
At the time of trial Meldrum was cross-examined as to
the relationship between the plea bargain and his testimony
as an expert witness for the State.

Meldrum testified that

there was absolutely no relationship between the two; that
his testimony against Mrs. Basta had nothing to do with the
plea bargain offered him by the Prosecution.

Meldrum

testified that he was "offended" at the mere suggestion of a
deal in exchange for his testimony.
Q.
A.

Your plea has been held in abeyance for a year?
Yes.

Q.
A.

The plea can be dismissed?
Yes.

Q.
You are to cooperate with the State as part of
your plea to make sure the charges are dismissed?
A.
Absolutely not.
Q.
It's not true?
A.
Absolutely not true.
(R. 477 )
In closing argument counsel for Mrs. Basta attacked

20

Meldrum's credibility and argued that because of his plea
bargain, Meldrum was biased, his testimony tainted.

The

prosecutor rebutted arguing that there was no deal with
Meldrum.

Further, the prosecution stated that the fact that

Meldrum came to court and testified in the absence of a deal
and despite of his dismissal as Sandy Fire Marshal spoke to
the "the character of the man" Specifically, the prosecutor
argued:
"Next", the defense said, "well, the reason you can't
believe Mr. Meldrum is he's got an interest in the
outcome of the case." He does? Did he get $2,000.00
to come in and testify like Mr. Smith? I mean, here's
a man who's no longer in the Fire Department. He
could have just said, hey, forget it, forget, it, I'm
no longer there, I don't really care, but the fact
that Dave Meldrum comes in here and testifies and
tells you the same thing that he concluded back in
February says something about his integrity. It says
something about the man." (R. 1034).
Unfortunately, what the prosecutor said to the Jury about
Meldrum was completely false, as Mr. Meldrum and the
prosecutor both knew.
Subsequently, Mrs. Basta was convicted of Aggravated
Arson and Insurance Fraud.
Following trial, defense counsel subpoenaed the tape of
Dave Meldrum's criminal plea before Judge Livingston.
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The

transcript of that plea clearly indicates that Meldrum was
given his plea bargain because he was a witness for the
State in ongoing arson prosecutions:
Judge: Mr. Shepherd is this your case?
Mr. D'Alesandro: it's mine your honor.
Judge Q: Why are we entering a no contest on a
theft case?
Mr. D'Alesandro: Well, there's actually a couple
of reasons. Chief among them is that Mr.. Meldrum,
regardless of his prior position, is still involved in
several felony investigations, cases that are pending
and our plan at this point is to continue to prosecute
those cases and with Mr.. Meldrum's cooperation.
Judge: Are you telling me that a felony.. That
misdemeanor plea would disable Mr. Meldrum from being
a witness?
A: No, but I think ah.. It wouldn't disable him
but with a no contest plea it would less likely be
used for impeachment purposes. I guess the thought is
your honor, is that he's an expert witness and would
be subject to impeachment and no contest will have to
be collaterally established in similar fashion to what
happens here today. (See Addendum " C " ) .
A.

DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS

The State of Utah violated Mrs. Basta's right to Due
Process of Law as guaranteed by the 5th and 14th Amendments
to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 7 of
the Utah Constitution when it failed to disclose the arrest,
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plea and the existence of its plea arrangements with
Meldrum.

The State had a duty to disclose the plea bargain

and the terms of the plea to the defense prior to trial in
this case.
In a criminal case, the prosecution is required to
provide to an accused, upon request, the following
materials:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the
defendant or co-defendant;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced
punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which one court
determines on good cause shown should e made available to
the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately
prepare his defense.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(attached hereto as Addendum " D " ) .
Once an accused requests any of the items in subparts
(1),

(2), (3) and

(5), the prosecution must either produce

the requested material or must identify explicitly those
portions of the request to which no responsive material will
be provided.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-17

(Utah

1987).
The prosecution's duty to produce information extends to

23

other members of the prosecution team. Id. at 918.

Once an

accused has requested production of discovery materials, the
prosecution must either produce the requested material or
identify the material not being provided. Id. at 917.
Failure to comply with discovery requests may violate an
accused's due process right.

State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7

(Utah 1993); Knight, 734 P.2d at 921. See, e.g. State v.
Jarrel, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980) (failure to inform the
defense of exculpatory or other relevant evidence may result
in violation of due process).
The prosecution always has a duty to provide subpart (4)
material, exculpatory evidence, even if the accused has not
requested the material.

Hay, 859 P.2d at 7 (Utah 1993);

Utah R. Pro. Responsibility 3.8(d)(Rules of ethics require
prosecutors to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense".)
Once an appropriate discovery request is made, the
prosecution has the duty to preserve and produce the
requested discovery.

Moreover, under Knight the State's

duty to disclose requested discovery and exculpatory "Brady"
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material is ongoing.
Mrs. Basta made a specific request for information
pertaining to offers of leniency to witnesses the State
intended to use at trial.

The State failed to specifically

indicate that it was refusing to respond to that request and
in fact, never did respond.

Further, information about

Meldrum's plea agreement was "Brady" information that should
have been provided even in the absence of formal request for
discovery.

Impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory

evidence falls within the Brady rule.
Mrs. Basta's rights to a fair trial and to due process
of law were violated when the State failed to disclose the
deal it had given Meldrum.
witness.

Meldrum was a key prosecution

His credibility was central to the State's case.

Meldrum was the first trained investigator on the scene and
the only witness to have inspected the wiring in the common
wall or the condition of the breaker panel. See Point II,
infra.

Meldrum's trial testimony was that the condition of

that wiring and the condition of the breaker panel showed
this fire as non-accidental.
Information pertaining to Meldrum's credibility was
material to the issue of guilt or innocence.
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The State's

suppression of information bearing on Meldrum's credibility
warrants a new trial irrespective of the prosecutions good
faith or bad faith.

See, Giglio v. United States, 31 L.Ed.

2d 104 (1972), United States v. Bagley, 87 L.Ed. 2d (1985).
B.

FALSE/PERJURED TESTIMONY

In violation of Mrs. Basta's rights was compounded by
the fact that Meldrum lied on the stand with respect to his
plea agreement with the State.

Meldrum testified that he

had no deal with the State and that his testimony at trial
against Mrs. Basta had nothing to do with the deal he
received on his own criminal case.

The colloquy referred to

from Meldrum's criminal proceedings of July 20, 1995,
clearly indicates otherwise.
Judge: Mr. Shepherd is this your case?
Mr. D'Alesandro: it's mine your honor.
Judge Q: Why are we entering a no contest on a
theft case?
Mr. D'Alesandro: Well, there's actually a couple
of reasons. Chief among them is that Mr.. Meldrum,
regardless of his prior position, is still involved
in several felony investigations, cases that are
pending and our plan at this point is to continue to
prosecute those cases and with Mr.. Meldrum's
cooperation.
Judge: Are you telling me that a felony.. That
misdemeanor plea would disable Mr. Meldrum from being
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a witness?
A: No, but I think ah.. It wouldn't disable him
but with a no contest plea it would less likely be
used for impeachment purposes. I guess the thought is
your honor, is that he's an expert witness and would
be subject to impeachment and no contest will have to
be collaterally established in similar fashion to
what happens here today.

(R. 194-95 Addendum "C" ) .

The State of Utah clearly

indicated that they intended to use Meldrum in other cases
and offered the plea bargain in an effort to secure his
cooperation and to prevent him from being impeached.
Meldrum's statements about the relationship between his
plea bargain and his testimony are patently false.

The

magnitude of the constitutional violation is further
exacerbated by the fact that the Prosecutor reiterated and
argued Meldrum's false testimony in his closing argument.
Specifically, the prosecutor attempted to bolster
Meldrum's credibility by arguing that Meldrum's deal had
nothing to do with his testimony against Mrs. Basta.

The

Prosecutor went on to argue that the mere fact Meldrum
showed up to testify absent a deal and having lost his job
as Fire Marshal spoke, "to the character of the man".
A new trial is required if "false testimony could.. In
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any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the
jury".

Naupe v. Illinois, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1217 (1959) (citing

Giglio v. United States, 31 L.Ed. 2d at 108). Given
Meldrum's importance to the case, false testimony respecting
his own criminal prosecution clearly could have affected the
judgment of the jury.

False testimony about items relating

to his credibility as well as argument by the prosecution
bolstered Meldrum's credibility in the eyes of the jury.
The plea bargain offer extended for Meldrum and the
reason for that offer were issues directly related to the
credibility of his testimony.

The jury had a right to know

those facts including the reasons for the deal.

More

importantly, Mrs. Basta had the right to be informed so that
her counsel could conduct proper and full cross-examination,
including critical impeachment examination.
Accordingly, Mrs. Basta requests this Court grant her a
new trial.
C.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
A prosecuting attorney is the representative not of
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
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d e f i n i t e sense t h e s e r v a n t of t h e law; t h e twofold
aim of which i s t h a t g u i l t s h a l l not escape or
innocence s u f f e r . He may p r o s e c u t e with e a r n e s t n e s s
and v i g o r — i n d e e d , he should do s o . But, while he may
s t r i k e hard blows, he i s not a t l i b e r t y t o s t r i k e
foul o n e s . I t i s as much h i s duty t o r e f r a i n from
improper methods c a l c u l a t e d t o produce a wrongful
c o n v i c t i o n as i t i s t o use every l e g i t i m a t e means t o
b r i n g about a j u s t one.
S t a t e v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992)(quoting
Berger v. United S t a t e s , 295 U.S. 78, 88 ( 1 9 3 5 ) ) .

The

p r o s e c u t o r v i o l a t e d t h e s e important maxims and knowingly
i n t r o d u c e d , defended and argued f a l s e / p e r j u r e d t e s t i m o n y in
v i o l a t i o n of c o n t r o l l i n g e t h i c a l g u i d e l i n e s 1 and fundamental
f a i r n e s s r e q u i r e d by our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

strictures.

G e n e r a l l y , t h e t e s t used for d e t e r m i n i n g whether a
p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t e m e n t s a r e improper and c o n s t i t u t e e r r o r i s
whether t h e remarks " ' c a l l e d t o t h e j u r o r s '

attention

m a t t e r s which t h e y would not be j u s t i f i e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g in
reaching a v e r d i c t . ' "
(Utah 1992)
1983)

S t a t e v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785

(quoting S t a t e v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah

(quoting S t a t e v. C r e v i s t o n ,
1

646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah

I n t h e Utah R u l e s of P r o f e s s i o n a l Conduct Rule 3 . 5 ( e ) i t
s t a t e s "A l a w y e r s h a l l n o t i n t r i a l , a l l u d e t o any m a t t e r t h a t t h e
l a w y e r d o e s n o t r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e i s r e l e v a n t o r t h a t w i l l n o t be
s u p p o r t e d by a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e , a s s e r t p e r s o n a l knowledge of f a c t s i n
i s s u e e x c e p t when t e s t i f y i n g a s a w i t n e s s , o r s t a t e a p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n
a s t o t h e j u s t n e s s of a c a u s e , t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s , t h e
c u l p a b i l i t y of a c i v i l l i t i g a n t o r t h e g u i l t o r i n n o c e n c e of an
accused."
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1982))) (footnote omitted).
The rules governing reversal in prosecution misconduct
cases are found in State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (1973),
which explains remarks of counsel may not (1) bring in
matters which should not be considered by the jury in
rendering a verdict, and (2) the inappropriate remarks or
behavior under the circumstances of the case may not
inappropriately influence the jurors in their verdict.
Analyzing this case reveals that the prosecutor brought
in matters the jury was not entitled to hear by manipulating
the testimony they did hear.

The proseucotr kept from the

defense the accurate information and truth about Meldrum's
criminal history and plea bargain.

He crossed that line

again when he permitted the false/perjured testimony of
Meldrum blatantly denying the truth of the plea bargain.
Perhaps most egregious of the prosecutor's behavior is then
knowingly arguing to the jury how credible and truthful
Meldrum was as a witness.

Our Supreme Court has stated,

"The State's obligation is to assure that justice is done.
That obligation does not include or authorize over-reaching,
exaggeration, or any form of personalizing by the prosecutor
in the deliberation process."

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
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546, 557 (Utah 1987) .
Two additional Utah Supreme Court cases elucidate the
issues in this sub-point:
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility
of witnesses and expressing his personal opinion
concerning the guilt of the accused pose two
dangers: [1] such comments can convey the
impression that evidence not presented to the
jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the
charges against the defendant and can thus
jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried
solely on the basis of the evidence presented to
the jury; and [2] the prosecutor's opinion
carries with it the imprimatur of the Government
and may induce the jury to trust the Government's
judgment rather than its own view of the
evidence.
State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1989) (quoting
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)).
A determination of step two for finding impermissible
prosecutor conduct depends mainly upon how strong the
evidence is leading to the defendant's guilt.

Our high

court has explained that for prosecutor's misconduct to
require reversal requires a conclusion that the
inappropriate information acquired by the jury in step one
results in undermining the confidence in the verdict, i.e.,
did the jury likely use that information to return their
verdict.

In part this analysis depends on the case.
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In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), the
Court reaffirmed its displeasure with prosecutors who would
"call attention to matters outside the evidence."

The

Court reversed the conviction in Troy stating, " The error
was then adduced as harmful requiring reversal because of
the conflicting evidence susceptible of differing
interpretations.

The greater the conflict in the evidence

of defendant's guilt, the more susceptible the jury will be
to utilize the improper information from the prosecutor to
tilt the scales inappropriately toward guilt warranting a
reversal of that conviction by the appellate court. Id.
Because Meldrum was such a critical witness for the
State (see also Point II, infra) , this Court must conclude
that the untruthful testimony received from Meldrum and then
bolstered by the prosecutor who improperly vouched for his
credibility inarguably impacted on the jurors' verdict.

A

reading of the transcripts reveals a case where expert
testimony resolved the decision for the jury.
The evidence presented by the State to support the
elements of Arson without the expert testimony is
inconclusive and/or too inherently improbable that it could
have supported a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
32

The State was unable to present any evidence to explain the
extremely large area of origin identified by its experts.
The only possibility that could explain the area of origin
involved the use of an accelerant.
was found at the scene.

However, no accelerant

In addition, Mrs. Basta was last in

the family room by all accounts at 9:00 a.m.

Brent Basta

left the basement and walked past the family room at 9:10
a.m.

If Mrs. Basta had ignited the fire at 9:00 a.m. by

igniting "common combustibles", the fire and common
combustibles would have been burning a full 10 minutes
before Brent Basta left the basement.

Given the type of

material that was stored in the basement (i.e. cardboard,
paper, wood, candles) the fire would have been raging in 10
minutes time.

Given that Brent Basta neither saw fire nor

was injured, such a scenario is so inherently improbable
that it could not independently support a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

See, State v. Workman, 852 P.2d

981 Utah (1993) .
Expert testimony likely resolved the conflict.

The

prosecutor's conduct regarding his expressed view of his
expert Meldrum and Meldrum's testimony impermissibly and
inappropriately tilted the balance against a fair trial as
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guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the convictions
entered against Mrs. Basta and remand this matter for a new
trial.
POINT II.
FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE FIRE SCENE DESTRUCTION,OF
MATERIAL EVIDENCE AND UNFAIRLY ATTACKING MRS BASTA' S
EXPERT WITNESS VIOLATED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL.
Sandy Fire Marshall Meldrum in the course of this
investigation removed critical electrical wiring from
the crime scene which then disappeared under
conflicting testimony.

Likewise, the status of the

initial view of the breaker panel box was not
preserved.

Because the removed wiring and breaker

panel condition were material to the issue of Mrs.
Basta's guilt or innocence, the State and its
investigators had a duty to preserve those items of
evidence.

The failure to preserve that evidence denied

Mrs. Basta's rights to due process of law and her
rights to a fair trial as guaranteed by both the state
and federal constitutions.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the-issue of
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destroyed evidence on the case of State v. Nebekerr 657
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1983) . Nebeker involved the
destruction of photograph arrays used by investigative
officers in efforts to identify the perpetrator.

The

photograph arrays were apparently shown to the victim
prior to the time of a line-up wherein the defendant
was identified.

Testimony produced at trial indicated

that the defendant's picture was not included in the
photograph arrays.

Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1361-63.

Defendant was convicted at trial and thereafter
appealed claiming that his rights to due process were
fundamentally violated by the destruction of the
photograph arrays.

The Supreme Court affirmed the

conviction stating:
Fundamental to either duty [the duty to
preserve evidence or the duty to disclose it]
is the prerequisite that the evidence
destroyed, disposed of, or suppressed by the
prosecution was material in the
constitutional sense.
Id. at 1363 (citing State v. Hudspeth, 593 P.2d 548
(Utah 1978)).
Constitutional materiality was defined by the
Court as evidence "vital to the issue of whether or not
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the defendant was guilty of the charge" and whether
there is a fundamental unfairness that requires the
Court to set aside the defendant's conviction.

Id.

(citing State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975)).
The Court went on to comment:
The mere possibility that an item of
undisclosed evidence might have helped
defense, or might have affected the outcome
of trial, does not establish "materiality" in
the constitutional sense.
Id. at 1365.

The earlier Stewart Court on the same

point had commented: "We think it advisable that those
charged with investigation and prosecution of crime
retain intact all records and other evidence pertaining
to the case until it is finally disposed of.

By

adopting such a practice, a claim of unfairness by one
charged with a criminal offense would be groundless."
State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477, 479 (Utah 1975).
Preservation of electrical wiring from a fire
scene would surely work no hardship on the
investigators.

As suggested by the Stewart Court, in

an Arson case little else could be suspected to be
preserved in order to avoid later challenges from an
accused.
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A second case addressing destruction of evidence
and due process violations is State v. Jimenez, 761
P.2d 577 (Utah App. 1988).

Jimenez involved a

defendant charged with assault on a peace officer.

A

video tape which may have recorded the incident was
routinely erased by jail personnel.

Following

preliminary hearing, the defense moved to dismiss the
charges based on a violation of due process stemming
from the destruction.

Following an evidentiary

hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion.

The State then appealed,

id. at 577-78.

The

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal,
noting that there had been no proof that a video tape
had been created that depicted the alleged assault.
Absent such proof, the defendant had failed to
establish evidence existed and then was destroyed.
In reaching its holding in Jimenez, the Court of
Appeals cited to the case of People v. Harms, 560 P.2d
470 (Colo. App. 1976). Harms similarly had involved
the destruction of a video tape depicting an
altercation between defendant and police officers.
Unlike Jimenez, however, the existence of the tape was
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established as was its importance to the guilt or
innocence of Harms.

Id. at 472-73.

The court ruled

that defendant's due process rights were violated by
the destruction of the video tape and reversed its
conviction Id. at 474.

In so holding the Colorado

Court of Appeals stated:
The duty to preserve evidence known to be
material is part of the duty to disclose.
The principle underlying this rule is the
constitutional requirement that a criminal
defendant be afforded due process. The focus
therefore is not upon the existence or extent
of any culpability by the authorities in
failing to preserve clearly material
evidence, a matter not generally susceptible
of proof by defendant. Rather, it is directed
at the effect that the loss of the particular
item of evidence has on defendant's ability
to defend against the criminal charges.
Id. at 472 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
The court went on to state:
The destruction of the video tape through
official misfeasance has effectively
precluded defendant from ever demonstrating
whether it supported his version of the
altercation. He was thus denied due process.
The evidence was destroyed was known to be
material and critical, and not merely
incidental to, the question of defendant's
quilt or innocence, and therefore, the duty
to preserve the film for its evidentiary
value was apparent. The significance of the
eradicated evidence in this case reflects
disfavorably on the failure to ensure its
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preservation.
Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
The court addressed the materiality of the tape
stating:
The materiality of the destroyed video tape
cannot be questioned. Had it been preserved,
it likely would have conclusively established
defendant's innocence or guilt.
Where, as here, crucial material evidence is
wholly destroyed by the prosecution, and the
responsibility for such destruction cannot
properly be imputed to the defense, any
requirement that defendant somehow
demonstrate that the evidence was exculpatory
becomes an absurdity, and is not imposed.
Id. at 474 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed observing,
"whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the states
to preserve the evidence, that duty must be limited to
evidence that might be expected to play a significant
role in the suspect's defense."

Salt Lake v. Emerson,

861 P.2d 443 (Utah 1993) (citing California v.
Tromobeta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984))(emphasis added).
Mr. Meldrum admitted that he was aware that the
electrical wiring was one of the possible causes of the
fire.

Donald Peak agreed.

Accordingly, it was
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foreseeable that such evidence would play a
"significant part in the suspect's defense." Cf.
Emerson, 861 P.2d at 448.
The Utah high court went on to state, "evidence
must both possess an exculpatory value that was
apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of
such a nature that the defendant would be unable to
obtain comparable evidence by any other reasonably
available means." id. at 489.
Not only was the evidence destroyed, the
photographs that were taken made it impossible to
assess the brittleness versus pliability" that Mr.
Meldrum stated would determine if the wiring had caused
the fire.
As the situation in this case, it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to show the importance of
missing evidence that the defense has not had the
opportunity to examine.

This near impossibility is due

to the fact that the brittleness versus the pliability
that Mr. Meldrum examined for could not be
independently determined by simply looking at a
photograph, as was so effectively argued by the State
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in closing.
The wire removed by Dave Meldrum was clearly
material to the issue of Mrs. Basta's guilt or
innocence.

The possibility that the wire had caused

the fire had to have been excluded by Meldrum beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Proximity to the State's claimed

area of origin, the fact that it was removed from the
wall and photographed repeatedly, the log and note
entries of Donald Peak and the char patterns depicted
in photographs, all point to the importance of the
wire.
There is more than a "mere possibility" that the
wire might have helped the defense.

David Smith

testified of the role the wire played in the ignition
of the fire.

The physical evidence and burn patterns

support its role in the fire. Donald Peak's notes and
log entries indicate his concerns regarding the wire.
Clearly the wire was material and should have been
preserved.
Neither the jury nor this Court can rely on
Meldrum's claims that the wire was "unimportant" and
"not evidence" in the constitutionally material sense.
41

An assertion by the very agency responsible
for the negligent or otherwise destruction of
evidence regarding its alleged content. . .is
insufficient to cure the damage resulting
from the defendant having been deprived of
its use in the preparation of his defense.
People v. Harmsf

560 P.2d at 575.

In this case, the assertion is further weakened,
due in light of the fact that the person making the
assertion, is the only person that examined the
evidence.

The person's credibility is also in question

due to a cooperative agreement the witness had with the
State and his own perjury.

See Point I, supra.

Constitutional materiality also looks to whether
there is a "fundamental unfairness that requires the
court to set aside the defendant's conviction."

State

v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359 (1983).
In this case, not only was the actual evidence
destroyed, but the State aggressively argued that the
defense expert's testimony should be disregarded
because he had the hubris to rely on the only evidence
that was preserved by the State, the photographs.

The

prosecutor stated in closing:
Well, finally we heard from the defense
expert, and there are a couple of things that
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I think are troubling about David Smith's
testimony. Oh, great credentials for this
man who claims that he investigated more than
6,000 fires. He is paid $2,000.00 to come in
here and testify for the defense. He only
relies on what somebody else has already done
to do his investigation. . . In fact, I put
Dave Meldrum back on the stand and I said,
"Have you ever heard such a thing that
somebody can reach a conclusion as to cause
and origin simply by looking at somebody
else's photographs?"
Boy wouldn't that be nice? I wish I could
solve all crimes by looking at somebody
else's photographs.
Mr. Meldrum replied,"No, I've never heard of
that being done."

(R. 1063-65) .

For the State to so aggressively

impeach an expert because he was unable to examine
evidence that the State failed to preserve is
fundamentally unfair and under the Nebeker analysis
requires a new trial.
Moreover, in failing to preserve the wire as
evidence; and in failing to prepare a single note or
report about the wire and condition of the wall; and in
failing to prepare a single photograph, note, or report
of the condition of the breaker panel; the State of
Utah, both investigators and prosecution, violated Mrs.
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Basta's rights to due process of law and her rights to
a fair trial.

The magnitude of the constitutional

violation provides the Court with good cause why the
convictions in this case should be reversed.

POINT III.
THE COMBINATION OF ERRORS OCCURRING AT TRIAL PREVENTED
MRS. BASTA FROM RECEIVING HER GUARANTEED FAIR TRIAL.

The combination of these errors identified in Points I
and II warrant overturning the jury's verdict.
inappropriate case to find harmless error.

This is an

The doctrine of

harmless error applies to "errors which, although properly
preserved below and presented on appeal, are sufficiently
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings."

State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 957-58

(Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d
(Utah 1989)), aff'd 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995).

116, 120

For an error

to require reversal, "the likelihood of a different outcome
must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the
verdict."

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).

In determining whether reversal is warranted, several
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factors are considered, including "the importance of the
witness' [s] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness
on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the
prosecution's case."

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205

(Utah 1987).
Arguably, the most important testimony introduced by the
State against Mrs. Basta was that of Mr. Meldrum.

In a fair

trial, the defendant's constitutional rights to due process
guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions would be
preserved by a trial unencumbered by the errors complained of
herein.

Both the issue of the discovery violation where the

State failed to provide the information of Meldrum's criminal
conviction and Meldrum's perjurious testimony coupled with
the inappropriate prosecutorial behavior arguing Meldrum's
untruthful testimony to the jury and

emphasizing that

testimony excessively balances heavily against a jury
decision free from those biases.
To the extent this Court would not reverse the jury
verdict based on each error independently, an examination of
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the impact of these errors collectively on the fair trial
request, requires relief for Mrs. Basta.
Indeed, the likelihood of a different outcome without the
cumulative errors complained of herein is sufficiently high
in this case rendering the errors harmful, not harmless, and
warrant disturbing the jury verdict.

The Court therefore,

should grant Mrs. Basta a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The errors complained of herein undermine one's
confidence in the verdict.

Mrs. Basta was unable to receive

a fair trial as a result of being denied important
constitutionally based rights.

For these reasons, Mrs.

Basta's convictions must be overturned a n O ) new trial
ordered.

VRIG^MD G. UDAY
Attorney for Mrs. Basta/
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76-6-103. Aggravated arson.
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of
fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a
participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-103, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, §
76-6-103; 1986, ch. 59, § 2.

76-6-102. Arson.
(1) A person is guilty of arson if under circumstances not
amounting to aggravated arson, by means of fire or
explosives, the person unlawfully and intentionally damages:
(a) any property with intention of defrauding an insurer; or
(b) the property of another.
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second degree
felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1) (b) is:
(a) a second degree felony if the damage caused is or
exceeds $5,000 in value;
(b) a third degree felony if the damage caused is or exceeds
$1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value;
(c) a class A misdemeanor if the damage caused is or exceeds
$300 but is less than $1,000 in value; and
(d) a class B misdemeanor if the damage caused is less than
$300.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-102, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, §
76-6-102; 1986, ch. 59, § 1; 1989, ch. 5, § 1; 1995, ch.
291, § 9.
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,
1995, substituted "is or exceeds" for "exceeds" and "less
than" for "not more than" in Subsections (3)(a) to (c),
"$300" for "$250" in Subsection (3)(c), "less than $300" for
"$250 or less" in Subsection (3)(d), and made stylistic
changes throughout the section.

76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance act - Punishment as
for theft.
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that
person with intent to defraud:
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written
statement or representation knowing that the statement or
representation contains false or fraudulent information
concerning any fact material to an application for the
issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, certificate, or
contract;
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or written
statement or representation as part of or in support of a
claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance
policy, certificate, or contract, or in connection with any
civil claim asserted for recovery of damages for personal or
bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the
statement or representation contains false or fraudulent
information concerning any fact or thing material to the
claim;
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived from a
fraudulent insurance act;
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a
scheme or artifice to obtain fees for professional services,
or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a class B
misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsections (1)(b) through (1)(d), is
punishable as in the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801
for communication fraud for property of like value.
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense
of insurance fraud under the same conditions as those set
forth in Section 76-2-204.
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under
Subsections (1) (b) through (1) (d) shall be measured by the
total value of all property, money, or other things obtained
or sought to be obtained by the fraudulent insurance act or
acts described in Subsections (1) (b) through (1) (d) .
History: C. 1953, 76-6-521, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, §
76-6-521; 1994, ch. 243, § 13.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,
1994, rewrote this section to such an extent that a detailed
analysis is impracticable.
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ADDENDUM "C

STATE OF UTAH
v,
DAVID MELDRUM

Mr. Pusey:

Your honor, Dave Meldrum.

Your honor, I believe we have a disposition for Mr. Meldrum as
well.

It is my understanding that the State would be willing to

move to amend the single count information to a Class A Attempted
Unlawful Control of a trailer..urn to which Mr. Meldrum would enter
a plea of No Contest, to be held in Abeyance for a period of one
year.

The proposed terms of the plea would be that he pay $150.00

in costs and that he be on good behavior with probation to the
Court.
Judge:
A*

That would be the only terms of the Plea and Abeyance?

That's my understanding, your honor-

Judge:

Mr. Shepherd is this your case?

Mr. Delasandro:
Q.

It's mine, your honor.

Why are we entering a No Contest on a theft case?

Mr. Delasandro:

Well, there's actually a couple of reasons.

Chief among them is that Mr. Meldrum, regardless of his prior
position, is still involved in several felony investigations, cases
that are pending and our plan at this point is to continue to
prosecute those cases and with Mr. Meldrum's cooperation.
Judge:

Are you telling me that a felony. . .that a misdemeanor

plea would disable Mr. Meldrum from being a witness?
A.

No, but I think ah...it wouldn't disable him but with a No

Contest plea it would less likely be used for impeachment purposes

0CC194

I guess the thought is, your honor, is that he's an expert witness
and would be subject to impeachment and No Contest will have to be
collaterally established in a similar fashion to what happens here
today.
Judge:

Well, if the plea is held in abeyance, wouldn't it have

to be collaterally established anyway?
A.

I think it's the plea that is admissible, and it's admissible

as to the impeachment as opposed to a (inaudible) .
Judge:

Just an exception to heresy rule?

against

interest,

I guess, a declaration.

It's a statement
Now, you're not

suggesting however in asking me to take a No Contest plea in
abeyance, Mr. Pusey, that in fact that the... that the incident did
not occur which in fact your client did not in fact hook the
trailer onto his truck and make a post-Miranda admission that he
took it without permission?
A.

No.

Judge:

We're not making an alford plea, your Honor.
O.K.

It would be an accurate to state then...that my

understanding is again both the Plea in Abeyance I suppose could be
premised upon lack of prior criminal history but the plea in
Abeyance, at least in part, as well as the No Contest plea is so
that Mr. Meldrum can in fact be more likely be able to testify as
an expert witness in any pending cases, is that true?
A.

That's true.

Court:
A.

Is Mr. Meldrum still employed in that same capacity?

He is not, your honor. I don't know his employment status but

he definitely has been terminated from this.
Q.

How many years?

0 ft\ ft 1 Q S

A.

17 years

merit

position.

He's paid

a

due price

for

(inaudible) mistake he made, your Honor.
Q:

What happens to that 17 out of 20?

Can't you just cash that

out?
A-

Yea.

Q.

Is this like a recreational trailer?

A.

No, utility.

Judge:

With the understanding then the plea will be held in

abeyance and not entered, Mr. Meldrum, how do you then plead
to...is it a Class A then?
A.

Is it attempted?

Attempted I believe.

Judge:

Attempted

trailer,

during

Unlawful

Control

the date and

of

a motor vehicle, or

at a place set

forth

in the

Information, will it be guilty or No Contest?
A.

No Contest, your honor.

Q.

A No Contest plea is received but not entered.

I'm going to

direct the clerk of the Court to hold that No Contest plea in
Abeyance for one year period of time.

The conditions will be #1,

your good behavior; and #2, the payment of $150.00 court cost
assessment.

If we give you 30 days from today, Mr. Meldrum, is

that enough time to pay the court cost?
Meldrum:

I'll just do it today.

Judge:

If you'll step to the counter then downstairs and write

out that check right away to take care of it, that will clear the
financial part of it. Thank you.
Atty:

Now, a year from now we'll be making appropriate motion

to the Court to submit a copy to Mr. Delasandro.

ADDENDUM "D

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall
disclose to the defense upon request the following material
or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant
or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or
codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced
punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his
defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as
practicable following the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the
defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as
required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any
other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in
order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall
make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as
soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make
disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or
defense may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party
that material and information may be inspected, tested or
copied at specified reasonable times and places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time
order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or
deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon
motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written
statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court
enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte

showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal,
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it
is brought to the attention of the court that a party has
failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence
not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems
just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may
be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily
impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the
crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail
scrapings, and other bodily materials which can be obtained
without unreasonable intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of
his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance
at the time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required
for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time
and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused
and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved
by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be
grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered
as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt
of the accused and shall be subject to such further
sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.

